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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
J. SEAL, 
Plaintjj and Appellant, 
- vs.-
TAYCO, INC., 
Defendant and Respondent. 
RESPONDENT'S BRIEF 
Case No. 
10171 
STATEMENT OF KIND OF CASE 
This is an action· on··account ·by Appellant .who 
is ·an assignee for merchandise sold.· in· the amount 
of $3,584.42. Respondent .admitted the account and 
claimed an offset thereto in the amount of $2,590.00. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT , 
. . ' . . . ' 
The case was tried to a jury on ;May 18;·1964 
in the District Court of Salt Lake County. The ju;ry 
returned a verdict for Appellant on _1ter assigned 
accpunt and found for ~espondent 011 its offset. 
1 
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The Court entered judgment for Appellant for the 
difference between the account and offset in the 
amount of $994.42 plus interest of $134.00. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Appellant demands that the judgment be modi-
fied so as to elin1inate therefrom the offset claim 
of Respondent's as found by the jury. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Plaintiff and Appellant is a bonded collection 
agency. The account sued on was owned by Ameri-
can Maganese Steel Division of the American Brake 
Shoe Company. Since Appellant, J. Seal, is only a 
nominal party in this<. action, Respondent will here-
inafter refer to Appellant as "AMSCO" which is 
the trade name of the owner of the account. 
Respondent, Tayco, Inc., is a Utah corporation, 
the stock of which at the time of the institution of 
this law suit \vas almost completely owned by one 
J. Verne Taylor. Prior to incorporation, the busi-
ness had been conducted by Mr. Taylor as a sole 
proprietor (R. 37). The business had been oper-
ated as a corporation and as a sole proprietorship 
for approximately 15 years at the time this law suit 
was instituted (R. 37 and 38). 
Respondent's connection with "AMSCO" went 
back a number of years. Respondent was a distribu-
2 
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tor for "AMSCO" and originally sold their products 
in Utah and eastern Nevada. The terri tory later 
included parts of Idaho. "AMSCO" n1anufactures 
electrodes, steel bar stock, and shape steels and these 
were the products distributed and sold in this terri-
tory by Respondent ( R. 38) . 
Respondent was an "AMSCO" distributor in 
the year "1957" and in that year the setoff which 
is the subject matter of this law suit occurred.* In 
January 19157 this oompany obtained an order from 
the Palisade Dam contractors for the purchase of 
certain track shoes. Track shoes are the n1etal pads 
on which the crawler type vehicles travel over the 
ground ( R. 41). A formal written purchase order 
was issued by Palisades contractor, dated january 
30, 1957 (Ex. 1). Prior to the date __ of this order, 
Respondent's salesman had been in contact with the 
Palisade Dam contractors and Respondents had also 
been in contact with "AMSCO" regarding these 
parts (R. 57). 
On January 25, 1957 "AMSCO" issued a writ-
ten com1nitment regarding t~ese track shoes. (Ex. 2). 
On January 31, 1957, Respondent issued its 
purchase order, No. 7144 to "AMSCO'' for the pur-
chase of the track shoes ordered by Palisades con-
tractors on January 30, 1957 (Ex. 3). 
*It w~s agreed bet~een the p~~es that "A:M_SOO"; ·is a foreign cor-
poration that has neve~ qua.I!fied ~to do bu~111~s in this state and 
hence, the Statute of Limitations Is not an ISsue in this case. 
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Thereafter on February 22, 1957 Respondent 
received a post card from "AMSCO" indicating that 
they had scheduled shipment one-half in April 1957 
and one-half in May 1957 (Ex. 8). 
It is to be noted at this point that in both the 
"AMSCO" (Ex. 2) and Respondent's purchase or-
der (Ex. 3) tin1e of delivery was clearly specified 
as of April 15, 19'57. On March 2, 1'957 Respondent 
wrote to "AMSCO" concerning the post card (Ex. 8) 
and stated as follows: 
''It is necessary to determine two i ten1s 
in this letter. First, the card received fron1 
Mr. Spangenberg on February 22 about the 
above order. This order was accepted by us 
for delivery not later than the 2nd week in 
April 1957 based on authority of Mr. Dan-
tiko and this delivery was by our customer 
specfied as being very necessary. Hence, your 
card ·which specified one-half of the order 
would be shipped in April and one-half in 
May absoluately dismayed us. 
"Will you please advance your schedule 
to meet the promised quotation given by Mr. 
Dantiko by airn1al 1-23-57, Quotation No. 
125-I-187, this was specified as sure of de-
livery by April 15, 1957, Order placed on 
this basis." 
On April 10, 1957 Palisades contractors for-
warded a telegran1 to Respondent which stated as 
follows: 
"Cancel our Order 56-2150 for three sets, 
26-inch shoes for HD tractors, because of fail-
4 
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ure to meet the requirements. 
S/ D. W. Kelley, Palisades Contractors" 
(Ex. 4) 
Thereafter on May 4, 1957 Respondent again 
wrote to "AMSCO" and stated in part as follows: 
''This letter is to acquaint you with the 
situation at Palisades. We contacted the boys 
there and they say they are not in a position 
to take the 26-inch shoes which they ordered 
and then cancelled, their No. 56-2150, our 
Order 7144 (Ex. 9)." 
The above Exhibits comprise the documentary 
evidence relating to the purchase of the track shoes. 
Mr. J. Verne Taylor also testified concerning the 
transaction. On direct examination he_ testified that 
'"AMSCO" never billed Respondent for the track 
shoes and in fact that only 100 of the.m were ever 
n1ade and that these· were not ma,de or Q,vailable 
until the latter part of May 1957 (R.46-47). Ad-
ditionally Mr. Taylor testified that after he had 
received the post card which pu.rported to change 
the date of delivery, he talked to Mr~· Ed Welsh 
who was head of·· the. foundry and was. advised by 
hin1 that he would do his best to n1eet the April 15, 
1957 deadline (R. 62-63). 
. . 
''AMSCO'' contends that this documentary evi-
dence and the testimony of Mr.· Taylor does not 
show a breach of contract entitling Respondent to 
da1nages. Under the points of argu1nent that follow, 
5 
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Respondent will show that this evidence shows a 
contract, a breach thereof by "AMSCO" for which 
damages by way of setoff were properly awarded 
by the jury. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. 
"AMSCO" WAS LIABLE FOR DAMAGES FOR BREACH 
OF CONTRACT. 
Appellant argues that Paragraph 4 (c) of Ex-
hibit 12 ( "AMSCO" quotation) eff1ectively insulates it 
from Respondent's claim for damages for breach of 
contract. 
'Paragraph 4 (c) of the "AMSCO" quote (Ex-
hibit 2) reads : 
" (c) Seller shall not be liable for any delays 
or defaults hereunder by reason of fire, 
floods, acts of God, labor troubles, inability 
to secure raw materials, acts of government, 
or other causes beyond reasonable control. In 
the event of any such delay, the date of de-
livery shall be extended for a period equal to 
the time lost by reason of the delay. In no 
event shall seller be liable for special or con-
sequential damages." 
Appellant concedes that none of the causes for 
delay mentioned in Paragraph 4 (c) are applicable 
to this case and further concedes that it would be 
more desirable had the last sentence of the above 
quotation be placed in a separate paragraph. 
6 
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The question before the lower court as before 
this court is the proper construction of that para-
graph. The lower court correctly ruled that the 
paragraph means that the seller shall not be liable 
for delays caused by extraordinary reasons and that 
in no event would seller be liable ·for special or con-
sequential damage by reason of delay from extra-
ordinary causes. "AMSCO" wrote this contractual 
provision. Under settled law, the provision must be 
construed n1ost strongly against the maker. Maw 
,.s. Noble, 10 Utah 2d 440, 354 P. 2d 121. 
Appellant contends that Paragraph 4 (c) 
means that it is not liable for special or consequen-
tial damage for any· reason. Questions immediately 
arise. Is "AMSCO" liable for any delay? Is it liable 
for breach of warranty? Is It liable for misdelivery? 
If "AMSCO" intended to immunize itself from all 
liability and pllace its customers completely at its 
mercy, surely it would have inserted a separate para-
graph in Exhibit 2 and insulated itself with ap-
propriate language. 
The interpretation adopted by the lower court 
is correct. The lower court simply held that the 
meaning of the last sentence of Paragraph 4 (c) 
n1ust bear some relationship to the terms, p_reced-
ing it. It cannot be taken out of context and given 
universal application. A logi_cal · interpretation of 
the paragraph is that "AMSCO" is not liable g~ner-
7 
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ally for extraordinary causes and in no event is liable 
for special or consequential damages occasioned by 
the extraordinary causes n1entioned in the para-
graph. 
''AMSCO" cites the case of Eastern Brass and 
Copper Company, Inc. vs. General Electric Supply 
Corporation, 101 F. Supp. 410 in support of its po-
sition. The case is easily distinguishable. The con-
tract in the Eastern Brass case (supra) did have a 
paragraph providing immunity from extraordinary 
causes. In a separate paragraph the contract pro-
vided: 
''We shall not under any circumstances 
be liable for special or consequential damages 
on account of delay in furnishing merchan-
dise contracted for or on account of the use 
or re-sale of such merchandise." 
In that case the contract specifically provided 
the area in which the seller was insulated from lia-
bility. There is no such preciseness of language in 
this case. The provision contended for by "AMSCO" 
is contained in a paragraph which n1entions delay 
caused by extraordinary events. Clearly it is re-
stricted to those events. 
The last contention of Appellant under its Point 
I. is that the damages in this case a warded to Re-
spondent were special and not general and, there-
fore, eliminated by the obscure language of Para-
graph 4 (c). 
8 
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Respondent lost its profit on the re-sale of this 
merchandise by reason of Appellant's breach of con-
tract. What we are here concerned with is whether 
loss of profits is special or general damage. Ap-
pellant cites no case or other authority for its 
statement that the damages in this case are special 
damage. 
The distinction between general and special 
damage is not always an easy one to n1ake. It de-
pends in great part upon the facts of each indi-
vidual case. The general rule is stated in 25 CJS 
(damages) Section 138 : 
"Whether or not recovery may be had 
for, or proof made, of loss of profits under 
a general .allegation of damages depends, of 
course, on whether or not such damages are 
on the facts involved to be considered general 
or special. Under some authorities, where the 
wrong complained of consists of or occasions 
the breach of contract the loss of profits aris-
ing from the breach may be recovered under 
a general allegation of damage, particularly 
where such loss is the natural and necessary 
result of the breach of contract. Under others, 
however, .a loss of profits resuting from 
breach of contract are considered special ra-
ther than general damages and must be 
pleaded to permit recovery thereof." 
By definition, gener~l damages are those that 
naturally and necessarily flow from- the wrongful 
act, while special dan1ages are such as naturally but 
9 
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not necessarily flow therefron1. In the Utah case of 
Anderson et al vs. Jensen et al, 71 Utah 295, 265 
P. 7 45, it is stated: 
''General damages, this court has held 
'are the natural and proximate consequences 
of, and are traceable to the act complained of 
and those damages which are probable, trace-
able to, and necessarily result from the injury 
. . . and may be shown under the general al-
legation of the complaint. Only those damages 
which are- not probable and the necessary re-
sult of the injury are termed "special" and 
required to be stated specially in the com-
plaint.' " 
The question in this case is whether the loss 
of profits are damages such as naturally and neces-
sarily flow from the breach (general damage) as 
opposed to those damages which naturally but do 
not necessarily flow therefrom (special damage). 
The distinction in this case is readily apparent from 
the documentary evidence on file. On Exhibit 3, 
the purchase order of Respondent, it is clearly stated 
that this order is for re-sale to Palisades Contractors 
and it is also. clearly stated that the customer speci-
fied delivery to be within two weeks of April1, 1957. 
It logicallly follows that '~AMSCO" knew that the 
order was one for :fte-sale and that the customer had 
specified ~a particular delivery date. Quite- clearly 
''A1WS'CO'' knew that the probable and natural result 
of its breach by failing to deliver timely would be the 
loss o'f profit on the sale. This is general damage. 
10 
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For a distinction, we again refer to Exhibit 3, 
the Respondent's purchase order. It also states: 
"This is only the beginning for this com-
pany. They have 40 tractors, so please pro-
cess this order at once and try and beat their 
delivery requirements." 
\Vere the damage in this case a claim for loss of 
profits on this future business, then there might 
be some merit to the assertion that that claim was 
one for special or consequential damage. 
The principle is aptly stated in i15 Am. J ur. 
(damages) Section 152: 
"According to some authorities, the line 
of distinction between profits which are re~ 
mote, consequential, or not within the con-
tenlplation of the parties and those which are 
proximate and absolute and certain and with-
in the contemplation of the parties seems to 
rest in the question whether they are to arrive 
directly out of the contract in question or its 
subject matter and to constitute the immedi-
ate fruits of the contract or whether they are 
to result from collateral engagements or en-
terprises." 
In this case the damages claimed are the direct 
and proximate result of its breach. · They would . be 
consequential only if· the collateral enterprise of ob-
taining the future business of the customer were 
involved. 
11 
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In summary, it is the position of Respondent 
that the contractual language of Exhibit 2 does not 
insulate "AMSCO" from claims for either special or 
general damage except as those which n1igh t arise 
from extraordinary events. This is the correct in-
terpretation of their agreement and the one adopted 
by the trial court. Even assuming, arguendo, that 
"AMSC·O" is not liable for specilal damage, still their 
position is untenable because the offset allowed by 
the jury in this ·case is general d a m a g e and 
'''AMSCO" concedes that it is liable for general dam-
age. 
POINT II. 
THE CONTRACT OF SALE PROVIDED FOR DELIVERY 
BY APRIL 15, 1957 AND WAS BREACHED BY "AMSCO" 
WHEN IT DID NOT DELIVER TIMELY. 
Appellant argues under its Point II. that the 
contract between the parties provided for delivery 
of one-half the order in April, 1957 and one-half in 
May, 1957 and that, therefore, there was no breach 
of contract by "AMSCO" at the time Respondent's 
customer cancelled its order. 
The documentary evidence in this case shows 
that on January 25, 1957 "AMSCO" issued its quo-
tation on the good~.to be sold. ·This quotation specifi-
·~ally provided. shipment by April15, 1957. 
On January 31, 1957 Respondent forwarded:its 
purchase order 'for material set forth in the·· quote 
for shipment April 1, 1957 (Ex. 3). Respondent 
12 
iri 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
 Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
also stated in that order that its customer specified 
shipment to be within two weeks of April 1, 1957. 
On F,ebruary 6, '1957 from the '·'A'MSCO" general 
office at Chicago Heights, Illinois, a letter (Ex. 7) 
was forwarded to Respondent accepting the order. 
A completed contract existed at that time. 
This con tract was breached by "AM'SC'O" on 
February 22, 1957 when it chose to change the date 
of shipment from Aprill, 19'57 or at the latest April 
15, 1957 (the shipping date specified in its quota-
tion) to ship1nent of one-half the order in April and 
one-half in May (Ex. 8). 
Thereafter Respondent wrote to ''AMSCO" (Ex~ 
5) and stated that the attempted change of delivery 
date was not acceptable. Respondent requested an 
advance of delivery date to meet "kMSCO's" prom-
ised quotation. Interestingly, "'A'MSCO" never re-
plied. Then it did not ,even meet or attempt to meet 
any delivery date, either contractual or otherwise, 
and only 100 of the track shoes were ever made and 
these were not available until the latter part of May, 
1957 (R. 46). 
Appellant seems to say that whether a contract 
existed and was breached in this case was a question 
of law for the trial court and not a matter of fact 
to be determined by the jury. The lower court sub-
mitted these questions to the jury under Instruction 
13 
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No. 2. Appellant does not clai1n error in this In-
struction, but rather contends that as a matter of 
law there was no breach of contract. 
"A:M'SCO". refers to its acceptance of the order 
stating that it was conditional as to date of delivery. 
What the "general office" had to say concerning 
this is as follbWs: -· 
"Within the course of the next few days, 
you will receive formal acknowledgement from 
each of the foundries mentioned above, and 
at the same time, will receive information con-
cerning shipment of the material." 
Does "information concerning shipment" mean 
that '''A:MSCO" has the right to :alter the date speci-
fied in its quotation which provided shipment on 
April15? Does it in fact have anything to do with 
date of shipment at all? It might very well mean in-
formation concerning method and route of shipment. 
These are-questions of fact upon which reason-
able men might disagree and hence, they are jury 
questions. 
In the lower court, "A'MSCO" offered no testi-
mony concerning the formation or breach of this 
contract or any , testimony concerning. the meaning 
of any term contained in the docun1entary evidence. 
Indeed in .its Brief, it ~ites no authority for its con-
clusion that these-are questions of law for the trial 
court.· 
14 
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The law does not support Appellant's conten-
tion. In 53 An1. Jur. (trial) Section 255 it is stated: 
"\Vhere one party to an action affirms 
and the other denies the existence of a con-
tract, and the evidence introduced is conflict-
ing, but there is evidence from which a con-
tract may be inferred, the jury should deter-
mine the fact of the existence or non-exist-
ence of the contract ... but the question 
whether informal writings such as letters, 
telegran1s, and other documentary evidence 
show that a contract was entered into must 
often be left to the jury . . ." 
Again in the san1e voume of American Juris-
prudence at Section 27 4, P. 232 it is stated: 
"An issue as to whether a contract or 
warranty has been breached is ordinarily, in 
cases tried before a jury, a question for the 
jury to determine from the facts and circum-
stances in proof, assuming that these facts are 
not undisputed or that different inferences 
may be drawn therefrom." 
See also the dissenting opinon in Hawaiian 
Equipment Company vs. Eimco Corporation, 115 
Utah 590, 207 P.2d 794. 
POINT III. 
THE CONTRACT WAS BREACHED BY "AMSCO" AND 
XOT CANCELLED BY MUTUAL CONSENT. 
Under Point III. of Appellant's brief, it argues 
( 1) the contract was cancelled by mutual consent 
and ( 2) if not so cancelled, Respondent is estopped 
to assert the claim. 
15 
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As to the claim of recission by mutual consent, 
Appellant cites no factual evidence in the Record 
to support its contention with the exception of Re-
spondent's letter of May 4, 1957 which advises 
''A'MSCO that 'Respondent's customer had cancelled 
and, therefore, Respondent was cancelling the order. 
At this time there had been no delivery and at least 
19 days had expired from the pron1ised date of de-
livery. 
Respondent had a legal right to cancel the con-
tract when "AMSCO" failed to deliver. 12 Am. Jur. 
(con tracts) Section 4'38. 
"AMSCO" had no right to cancel the agreement 
after it defaulted in performance except by a further 
agreement founded upon adequate consideration. 
Evidence of such agreement and · consider.ation is 
completely lacking in· this ·case. -
The finding of the jury that "AMSCO" breach-
ed the·agreement'predudes the assertion that it was 
mutually rescinded. Further, . this issue was sub-
mitted to the jury under the Court's instruction No. 
5 and resolved against .appellant. 
"AM'S'CO" th,en; ·claims u_nder its Point III. that 
if the contract was not rescinded, Respondent is 
nonetheless estopped to assert th~ claim by reason of 
delay. Without citing evidence or legal· au~hority 
''AMBOO" simply states that its credulity is stretch-
16 
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t•d beyond the breaking point to ilnagine that even 
Mr. Taylor could believe that Respondent had a justi-
fiable claim. 
''AMSCO" failed to point out to this Court that 
it has never qualified to do business in this state 
and elected to assign this claim for suit rather than 
appear in its own na1ne and subject itself to the full 
jurisdiction of the Courts of this state. ~other claims 
of Respondent for amounts far exceeding the 
"AMSCO" claim were the subject of this law suit 
below and were excluded by the Court as a matter 
of law. The timidity of "AMSCO" to subject itself to 
the jurisdiction of the Courts of this state can be 
ascribed in part to the fact that it knew at all times 
that these claims by Respondent were pending 
against it. Also, since Respondent could not assert 
its claim in this state until ''A'MSCO" sued, there 
was no 'delay. 
A complete answer to Appellant's estoppel ar-
gument is that it was never an issue in the trial 
below. "AMSCO" offered no evidence in this regard 
and requested no instructions. 
Even further, delay cannot be the basis for es-
toppel unless the other party has materially changed 
its position to its prejudice, 19 Am. J ur. · (estoppel) 
Section 59. There is no evidence of change of posi-
tion in this case. 
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POINT IV. 
MITIGATION OF DAMAGE WAS NOT AN ISSUE IN 
THE .TRIAL COURT. 
Under Point IV. of its brief, ''AMSCO" argues 
that Respondent was under a duty to 1nitigate its 
damage. 
Here again we are cited no evidence in support 
of Appellant's proposition that Respondent could 
have obtained a reasonable substitute for the goods 
in the market and thereby reduce or eliminate its 
damage. 
Here again the issue was ·never raised in the 
trial court and no instructions were requested so 
that the issue could be put to the jury. 
If a seller who breaches a contract clain1s that 
the buyer could have n1itigated the damage, it is up 
to the seller to prove it. This rule is clearly stated 
in 46 Am. Jur. (sales) Section 707. We quote: 
"The burden of proving that the dam-
ages alleged to have been sustained by the 
Buyer have been prevented or mitigated by 
his actions rests on the seller as the party 
charged with responsibility for breach of the 
con tract.'' 
This burden was never undertaken in the trial 
court by Appellant. 
POINT V. 
TIME WAS OF THE ESSENCE OF THIS CONTRACT. 
The argument of Appellant thattime was not 
of the essence of this con tract can be answered very 
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simply by referring to Ex. 3 which is the purchase 
order of Respondent. It says: 
"THEY SPECIFY: 
DELIVERY DATE TO BE WITHIN 2 
WEEKS OF APRIL 1, 1957. 
SHIP AS COMPLETED FOR IF THESE 
COULD BE RECEIVED BY THE 1ST. OF 
APRIL THEY WOULD BE MOST HAPPY 
AND THEIR START FOR SPRING WORK 
WOULD BE ADVANCED THAT MUCH.'' 
It is difficult to conceive of how a lay person 
could better state that time was of the essence of 
this sale. 
And here again, this issue was never raised in 
the trial court. 
POINT VI. 
THE DAMAGES AWARDED BY THE JURY TO RE-
SPONDENT WERE PROPER. 
Without attempting to n1athematically analyze 
in every respect and detail the damages a warded 
by the jury in this case, suffice it to say that the 
amount of their award of $2,590.00 was within the 
figure of $2,799.84 set forth in Appellant's Brief. 
CONCLUSION 
Respondent believes that the only proper ques-
tion before this court is the construction of the docu-
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mentary evidence submitted to the jury in this case. 
These documents clearly show an agreen1ent be-
tween these parties for the sale and delivery of 
certain track shoes. This issue was submitted to the 
jury and the jury found a contract and also found 
that it had been breached by "AMSOO." 
Many issues raised on this appeal were never 
raised by Appellant in the trial court. Much of the 
argument of Appellant relates to issues that were 
properly submitted to the jury and determined 
against Appellant. 
There is no error in the r-ecord and the verdict 
of the jury is correct in all respects. 
Respectfully submitted, 
HANSON & GARRETT 
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